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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
DWAYNE MARVIN CARLSON,

Case No. 960135-CA
Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This appeal is from a final judgment and conviction for
Receiving and Transferring Stolen Property, a 2nd° felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1316(2) (1993) (a copy of the
judgment is attached hereto as Addendum A), entered in the Third
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, the Honorable Pat B. Brian, presiding.

Defendant/Appellant

Dwayne Marvin Carlson ("Carlson") also pled guilty to additional
misdemeanor offenses, including giving false information to a
peace officer and driving on a suspended license, which the state
dismissed on its own motion.

Jurisdiction is conferred on this

Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1995).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issues presented for review are as follows:
1.

Whether the trial court erred in submitting an

instruction to the jury which created a rebuttable presumption
that Carlson's mere possession of reportedly stolen property was
proof that he stole the property and knew that it was stolen.
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

"Determining the propriety of a jury
1

instruction presents a question of law" which is reviewed nondeferentially for correctness.

State v. Brooks, 833 P.2d 362,

363 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); see also State v. Smoot. No, 950550
(Utah Ct. App. June 20, 1996).
2.

Whether the trial court erred in allowing the

prosecutor during closing argument to make prejudicial remarks,
which called the attention of the jurors to an obligation to
convict Carlson on some basis other than the evidence.
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

The trial court's ruling on whether the

prosecutor's conduct merits a mistrial will be overturned for
abuse of discretion.

State v. Cummins, 839 P.2d 848, 852 (Utah

Ct. App. 1992); see also State v. Wright, 893 P.2d 1113, 1118
(Utah Ct. App. 1995).
PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT
Carlson's objection to the state's proposed jury instruction
is preserved in the Record on Appeal ("R.") at 267-69, and his
objection to the prosecutor's inflammatory and improper
statements during closing argument is preserved at R. 293-95.
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The following statutes and constitutional provisions will be
determinative of the issues on appeal:
Utah Code Ann. § 41-la- 1316 (1993), Receiving or
transferring stolen motor vehicle, trailer, or
semitrailer -- Penalty.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-503 (1995), Presumption of fact.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-4 02 (1995), Presumptions and
defenses.
2

Article I, Section 7, Utah Constitution.
Amendment V, United States Constitution.
Amendment XIV, United States Constitution.
The text of those provisions is contained in the attached
Addendum B.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and
Disposition in the Court Below.
On July 22, 1995, Officer John Sheets ("Sheets") observed
Carlson in a brown Mazda pickup truck that was missing a front
license plate.

(R. 176.)

street and detained him.

Sheets followed Carlson to a side
(R. 176-78.)

During detention, Carlson

provided Sheets with false identification and blurted, "This
vehicle isn't stolen," prompting Sheets to call for officer
assistance.

(R. 179-80.)

After a second officer, Greg Carlson, arrived, the officers
ran a check on the rear license plate number and the vehicle
identification number.

(R. 180-82.)

The check reflected the

Mazda pickup truck as reported stolen. (R. 182.)
The officers arrested Carlson.

(R. 182-83.)

He was charged

by Information with Count I: Receiving or Transferring a Stolen
Motor Vehicle, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1316(2)
(1953 as amended); Count II: Giving False Information to a Peace
Officer, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-506(1) (1953 as
amended); Count III: License Plate and Registration Card Violation, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1305(1) (1953 as
3

amended); and Count IV: Driving on a Suspended License, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-227 (1953 as amended), (R. 7-10.)
After a jury trial, wherein Carlson admitted to giving false
information to a peace officer and stipulated that on July 22,
1995, he was driving on a suspended license, the state on its own
motion dismissed Counts II, III, and IV.

(R. 92, 121-23, 199.)

The jury returned a verdict of guilty on Count I.

(R. 120.)

On

February 9, 1996, the trial court entered judgment, sentencing
Carlson to a term of not less than one year nor more than fifteen
years in the Utah State Prison.

(R. 145-46.)

The trial court

stayed the prison sentence and placed Carlson on probation in the
custody of the Utah Department of Corrections, where he currently
is serving 12 months in a Department of Corrections program.
(Id.)

Carlson is appealing from the entry of the February 9,

1996 judgment.

(R. 147-48.)
STATEMENT OF FACTS

During the late evening of July 14, 1995, Carlson was
visiting friends at the Crystal Inn Hotel when he saw an
acquaintance, Laura, pushing a brown 1981 Mazda pickup truck with
a dented front end.

(R. 207-08.)

Carlson knew Laura to be the

girlfriend of another acquaintance, Steve Johnson. (R. 208, 210.)
When Carlson offered to help, Laura accepted and represented to
him that she and Steve Johnson jointly owned the Mazda truck.
(R. 210, 236.)
started.

Carlson was unable to get the Mazda truck

(R. 209.)

He and Laura left it in a restaurant parking

lot and went to Doug Haycock's house where Carlson slept while
4

Haycock and Laura ran errands in Carlson's Nissan station wagon.
(R. 210.)
The next morning, July 15, Carlson discovered Laura had not
returned with his station wagon. (R. 211.)
Johnson and asked him about Laura.

He found Steve

Steve Johnson told Carlson

that he did not know where Laura could be found and that the
Mazda truck belonged to her.

(R. 212.)

Carlson's mother

testified that thereafter she reported to the police that
Carlson's station wagon was missing.

(R. 223, 249.)

Carlson's friend, Troy Murdock ("Murdock"), testified that
on July 18, 1995, he and Carlson returned to the restaurant
parking lot where the Mazda truck had been abandoned four days
earlier and Carlson repaired it.

(R. 214-17, 255-56.) There-

after, Carlson set out to find Laura in order to return the Mazda
truck to her and to recover his station wagon. (R. 216, 253.)
On July 22, 1995, Sheets observed Carlson driving the Mazda
truck on Main Street in Salt Lake City without a front license
plate.

(R. 175-76.)

Sheets made a turn to follow the Mazda and

the driver "accelerated a little bit, and cut through traffic,
and turned down" a side street.

(R. 176.)

After Sheets located

the truck, he approached Carlson and requested identification.
(R. 177-78.)

Carlson admitted to the jury that in response to

Sheets' request, he twice provided a false name, a false social
security number, and an incorrect birth date, and he lied about
having a valid driver's license. (R. 218-19, 224-26, 239.)

He

also admitted to the jury that he misled officers because he was
5

afraid he would go to jail and was nervous for "driving on a
suspension," and he knew there was an outstanding warrant for his
arrest.

(R. 226-230.)

In response to questions concerning the Mazda pickup truck,
Carlson did not disclose to Sheets that Laura was the owner
because he did not know her last name.

(R. 221.)

told Sheets the Mazda belonged to Steve Johnson.
35, 183-84.)

Rather, he
(R. 221, 234-

According to Sheets, before he asked Carlson about

the Mazda truck, Carlson blurted, "This vehicle isn't stolen,"
prompting Sheets to call for officer assistance.

(R. 179-80,

230-31.)
After a second officer, Greg Carlson, arrived to assist
Sheets, they ran a check through dispatch on the rear license
plate number of the Mazda truck and on the vehicle identification
number.

(R. 180-82, 195.)

The check reflected the license plate

belonged to a Buick and the Mazda truck was reported stolen that
morning by a used car dealer, Steve Clark.
195-96.)

(R. 164, 169, 181-82,

Meanwhile, Sheets discovered through dispatch that

Carlson had given him misleading information concerning his
identification.

Thus, he arrested Carlson and provided him with

his rights per Miranda. (R. 180, 182.)
After Carlson was in police custody, officers released the
Mazda truck to the used car dealer, Steve Clark ("Clark").
165, 196.)

(R.

Clark testified that a "by-pass" or "after-market"

ignition had been placed on the steering column of the Mazda, and
that such ignitions allow vehicle operators to bypass the initial
6

ignition in order to start the vehicle engine.

(R. 167-68, 172.)

Clark also testified that such bypass ignitions may be used if
the original ignition is not working properly.

(R. 172.)

Sheets, Carlson, and corroborating defense witnesses testified
that they did not observe a "by-pass" or "after-market" ignition
on the steering column of the Mazda when Carlson was in
possession of the vehicle.

(R. 185-86 (Sheets' testimony), 237-

38, 242 (Carlson's testimony), 254 (Josh Maestas' testimony).)
In addition, Clark and Sheets testified that the Mazda suffered
no damage while in Carlson's possession and there were no signs
of forced entry to suggest that it had been stolen or that anyone
had broken into it.

(R. 171, 187.)

On July 28, 1995, Carlson was charged by Information with
Count I: Receiving or Transferring a Stolen Motor Vehicle, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1316(2) (1953 as amended);
Count II: Giving False Information to a Peace Officer, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-506(1) (1953 as amended);
Count III: License Plate and Registration Card Violation, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1305(1) (1953 as amended);
and Count IV: Driving on a Suspended License, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-227 (1953 as amended). (R. 7-10.)1
During the jury trial on Count I, Receiving or Transferring
a Stolen Motor Vehicle, the state proposed an instruction, which

1

In addition to admitting to the jury that he had provided Sheets
with false information concerning his identification (R. 218-19, 224-26,
239), Carlson stipulated during trial that on July 22, 1995, he was
driving on a suspended license. (R. 199.)
7

the trial court provided to the jury over Carlson's objection:
Possession of property recently stolen, if not
satisfactorily explained, is ordinarily a circumstance
from which you may reasonably draw the inference and
find, in light of the surrounding circumstances shown
by the evidence in the case, that the person in
possession of the stolen property stole the property
and knew that the property was stolen.
Thus, if you find from the evidence and beyond a
reasonable doubt (1) that the defendant was in
possession of property, (2) that the property was
stolen, (3) that such possession was not too remote in
point of time from the theft, and (4) that no
satisfactory explanation of such possession has been
given or appears from the evidence, then you may infer
from those facts and find that the defendant stole the
property and knew the property was stolen.
(R. 110, 096, 267-69.)

During closing argument, the prosecutor

placed special emphasis on that instruction:
It seems to me probably the most important
instruction you were given, and I don't remember the
numbers, but it's the one that starts off with,
"Possession of property recently stolen, if not
satisfactorily explained is ordinarily a circumstance
from which you may reasonable [sic] draw the inference
and find in light of the surrounding circumstances by
the evidence that the person in possession of the
stolen property knew or had reason to believe it was
stolen," and then it goes on to the next paragraph to
say, "If you find from the evidence that the defendant,
one, was in possession of the property, two, the
property was stolen, three, that the possession was not
too remote in point of time from the theft, and four,
that no satisfactory explanation of such possession had
been given, you may infer from those facts and find
that the defendant knew the property was stolen."
You will note that those are the requirements. I
don't think there's any question he was in possession
of the property. There's no question it was stolen.
There's no question that it was not too remote in time.
I mean, he's in possession on the 22nd. The vehicle
was stolen according to the owner, Mr. Clark, at least
two days earlier. According to the defendant, he had
it for four days. I don't think there's any question
about possession of recently stolen property.
8

The only real issue here is whether or not you buy
his explanation as to how he gained possession of this
property. That's really what this case is all about.
(R. 271-72 (A complete set of the instructions provided to the
jury is attached hereto as Addendum C).)
In addition, during closing argument, the prosecutor stated
the following:
Well, members of the jury, I submit to you that if
after this case is all over you walk out to the parking
lot and you discovered that somebody has stolen your
vehicle, and two or three days go by and all of a
sudden as you're driving down the road, you see your
vehicle and you see Mr. Carlson driving that vehicle,
and you pull him over and stop him and you say to him,
"What are you doing in my vehicle?" -*

*

*

And you say to him, "What are you doing in my
vehicle?" And he says to you, "Steve Johnson gave me
this vehicle," I submit to you there isn't one of you
that would let him go, that would simply let him walk
away. What you would do is call the police or you'd
hang on to him yourself and yet, that's exactly what
the defense is asking you to do in this case, to let
him go because he comes in to this courtroom and tells
you that the story he gave Officer Sheets when he
pulled him over was that somebody just gave him this
vehicle. Well, members of the jury, I submit that you
wouldn't buy it if you were in that situation, and I
submit also that you shouldn't buy it in this case. I'm
not saying the defendant stole the vehicle, but what we
are saying was that he was in possession of a stolen
motor vehicle and he knew or had reason to believe it
was stolen.
(R. 293-94.)

The jury returned a guilty verdict on Count I; the

state dismissed Counts II, III, and IV.

(R. 120-22.)

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court submitted to the jury an instruction that
created a presumption of guilt, which violates Utah statutory
law, case law, and constitutional law as follows:
9

The presumption instruction violates Utah Code Ann. § 76-1503 for two reasons. First, that portion of the instruction
that directed the jury to presume Carlson "stole the property" based on his possession of the vehicle was not supported
by the evidence or the Information, since Carlson was never
charged in this matter with theft, larceny or stealing the
property. Second, that portion of the instruction that
directed the jury to presume Carlson "knew the property was
stolen" is not supported by a presumption "established by
[Utah] code or other penal statute." U.C.A. § 76-1-503.
That portion of the instruction that directed the jury to
presume Carlson "stole the property," was loosely patterned
after Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-402(1). The Utah Supreme Court
has repeatedly ruled that the statutory presumption is
"addressed only to the court," and is relevant to the trial
court in considering whether the evidence is sufficient to
constitute a prima facie case. State v. Crowder, 197 P.2d
917, 921 (Utah 1948). For the trial court to instruct the
jury with respect to the presumption is erroneous. Id.
The presumption instruction violates the due process
provisions of the Utah and federal constitutions. The
instruction together with the entire jury charge possibly
were interpreted by the jury to relieve the state of its
burden of proof on the element of mental culpability, giving
the instruction a "conclusive" effect. Alternatively, the
jury may have given the instruction the permissive
interpretation, which has the effect of shifting the burden
of proof to Carlson to prove he lacked the requisite mental
culpability. Both interpretations are unconstitutional. In
addition, the instruction was irrational. It asked the jury
to find that Carlson had reason to believe the vehicle was
stolen, based on his possession of the vehicle. Because the
instruction and jury charge create a tenuous inference, the
instruction is unconstitutional.
The trial court also erred in permitting the prosecutor to
make remarks during closing argument that effectively encouraged
the jurors to put themselves in the position of the victim.
remarks constitute prosecutorial misconduct.

The

The improper re-

marks and presumption instruction compromised the verdict and the
substantial likelihood of a more favorable result for Carlson.

10

ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE INSTRUCTION PROVIDED TO THE JURY WAS
IMPROPER AND CREATED AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION.
During trial, the jury in this matter was charged with
determining whether Carlson was innocent or guilty of Count I,
Receiving or Transferring a Stolen Motor Vehicle, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1316(2) (1993).

That provision states:

It is a second degree felony for a person:
•

(2) to have
trailer, or
believe has
not a peace
performance

*

*

in his possession any motor vehicle,
semitrailer that he knows or has reason to
been stolen or unlawfully taken if he is
officer engaged at the time in the
of his duty.

The trial court submitted to the jury an instruction concerning
the elements of the charged offense.

It stated that to convict

Carlson of the offense, the jury must find,
1.
That on or about the 22nd of July, 1995, in Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant, Dwayne
Carlson, had in his possession a motor vehicle; and
2.
That the defendant knew that said property had
been stolen or had reason to believe that said property
had been stolen; and
3.
That the defendant had in his possession said
property with the purpose to deprive the owner thereof.
(R. 112.)
As set forth in the Statement of Facts, the trial court also
submitted an instruction that directed the jury to find that
Carlson had the requisite mental state to steal

the Mazda truck

and to know it was stolen based on his possession of the Mazda
truck.

The instruction directed the jury to render a guilty

verdict if it found, (1) Carlson was in possession of the Mazda
11

truck, (2) the Mazda truck was stolen, (3) Carlson's possession
was not too remote in point of time from the theft, and (4) no
satisfactory explanation of such possession was given or appeared
from the evidence (R. 110, 267-69) (hereinafter the
"Instruction").

The trial court submitted that Instruction to

the jury in violation of Utah statutory and case law and state
and federal constitutional provisions.
A. The Instruction Improperly Expanded a Utah
Statutory Presumption.
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-503 (1995), the issue of
an evidentiary presumption may be submitted to the jury if it is
"established

by

this

code

or other

penal

statute,"

the state has

presented "evidence of facts which support the presumption," and
the trial court deems the presumption appropriate.

Only part of

the presumption submitted to the jury in this matter was patterned after a statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-402 (1), 2 while the
remainder of the Instruction clearly was not established by "code
or other penal statute."
Section 76-6-402(1) provides the following:
Possession of property recently stolen, when no
satisfactory explanation of such possession is made,
shall be deemed prima facie evidence that the person in
possession stole the property.

2

The text of the Instruction deviates in part from the language
of the statute as follows: where the statute states, ". . . such
possession

. . . shall

be deemed

prima

facie

evidence

that the person

in possession stole the property", the Instruction states: "Possession
. . . is ordinarily
a circumstance
from which vou may reasonably
draw the
inference
and find, in light
of the surrounding
circumstances
shown by
the evidence
in the case, that the person in possession of the
stolen
property stole the property and knew that the property
was
stolen."
(Compare Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-402(1) to R. 110, 267-69.)
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That statute is relevant in cases where the defendant is charged
with burglary, robbery or larceny. See State v.Johnson, 745 P.2d
452 (Utah 1987) (aggravated robbery, aggravated assault, and
theft); State v. Clayton, 658 P.2d 621 (Utah 1983) (auto theft
prosecution); State v. Sessions, 583 P.2d 44 (Utah 1978); State
v. Heath, 492 P.2d 978, 979 (Utah 1972); State v. Donovan, 294 P.
1108 (Utah 1931) (robbery case).

Although the Instruction in

this case directed the jury to find that Carlson's possession of
the stolen vehicle supported the inference that he "stole the
property" (R. 110, 267-69), the state failed to present evidence
to support that presumption.

In fact, the state failed to charge

Carlson with such an offense in this case.

(R. 7-10; 293-94 (the

prosecutor unequivocally affirmed that Carlson was not accused of
stealing the vehicle).)

Thus, under Section 76-1-503, it was

improper for the trial court to submit to the jury that portion
of the presumption Instruction that was established by Utah Code
Ann. § 76-6-402(1) (1995).
With regard to the remainder of the Instruction (see the
emphasized portion of the Instruction set forth in note 2,
supra), the jury was instructed to infer that Carlson had the
requisite mental state to commit the offense of receiving stolen
property based on his possession of the stolen vehicle.

That

presumption is not "established by [the Utah] code or other penal
statute." Thus, under § 76-1-503, the trial court erred in providing that portion of the presumption Instruction to the jury.
B. The Presumption Established by Section 76-6-402(1)
Is Directed to the Trial Court, Not the Jury.
13

In the event this Court determines the portion of the
Instruction going to the charge of receiving stolen property was
established by "code or other penal statute,"3 the trial court
erred in submitting it to the jury for the following reason: The
statutory

presumption identified at § 76-6-402(1) is not an issue

for the jury.
The Utah Supreme Court repeatedly has ruled that the
statutory presumption identified in Section 76-6-402(1) "merely
provides a standard by which to determine whether the evidence
presented warrants submission to the jury."
709 P.2d 321, 327 (Utah 1985).

State v. Chambers,

"If a defendant makes no

satisfactory explanation of his possession of stolen property,
the trial judge can conclude that the State has established a
prima facie case against the defendant and submit the case to the
jury."

State v. Pacheco, 712 P.2d 192, 194 (Utah 1986); State

v. Graves, 717 P.2d 717 (Utah 1986) (in determining the
sufficiency of the evidence, court considers whether the
statutory presumption has been met); Crowder, 197 P.2d at 921
(the statutory presumption is "addressed only to the court, it
determines for the court what evidence is sufficient to
constitute a prima facie case, and it is the duty of the court
when a prima facie case has been made to submit it to the jury,

3

The trial court's submission of the portion of the Instruction
directing the jury to find that Carlson "stole the property" clearly was
erroneous since Carlson was never charged with or tried for stealing- the
property. Thus, the issue of whether the trial court erred in submitting
that portion of the Instruction to the jury is obvious and merits no
further discussion.
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but it does not require the court to instruct the jury that such
facts constitute a prima facie case"); State v. Barretta, 155 P.
343, 346-47 (Utah 1916) (presumption presents a question of
efficiency of the evidence, which is a question of law; the court
cannot leave that question to a jury).

Thus, the statutory pre-

sumption is a tool for the trial court to determine whether the
evidence is sufficient to go to the jury or to support a verdict.
In this case, the trial court's characterization of the
presumption as a factual "inference" (see note 2, supra) does not
alter the purpose of the presumption as stated in Chambers,
Pacheco, Graves, Crowder, and Barretta.

See State v. Sorenson,

758 P.2d 466, 468 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (this Court disregards the
trial court's characterization of a legal presumption as a
"factual assumption").

The trial court is the exclusive finder

of fact with regard to the evidentiary presumption, just as it is
with other preliminary evidentiary and jurisdictional issues.
Trial courts hear evidence and make determinations concerning (1)
the suppression of evidence in criminal proceedings; (2) "the
qualifications of a person to be a witness, the existence of a
privilege, or the admissibility of evidence", Utah R. Evid. 104;
(3) the voluntariness and admissibility of a confession, State v.
Hinton, 680 P.2d 749, 751 (Utah 1984)
U.S. 477

(1972)

(citing Lego v. Twomey, 404

(the Sixth Amendment right to a jury does not

change the normal rule that the admissibility of evidence is a
question for the court rather than the jury)), overruled on other
grounds, State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 463 n.71

(Utah 1 9 8 8 ) ; and

(4) jurisdiction and venue, Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501(3)
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(1995).

While a party may introduce at trial evidence relating to the
geographical location of a crime, the evidence does not
constitute a relinquishment to the jury of the trial court's
obligation to determine jurisdiction.

Simple semantics cannot

transform the trial court's responsibility to determine whether
the state has presented a prima facie case into a question of
fact for the jury.
Thus, the submission of an instruction emphasizing facts
relevant to the evidentiary presumption, whether such facts are
characterized as "prima facie evidence" or factual inferences,
"could only be confusing and might lead the jury to conclude the
State had met its burden of proving ultimate guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt by making out a prima facie case."

Chambers,

709 P.2d at 327 (quoting State v. Hall, 145 P.2d 494, 500 (Utah
1944)); Crowder, 197 P.2d at 921.

Submitting the issue of such a

presumption to a jury may cause the jury to single out and
emphasize less compelling particular evidence in a case to
determine guilt, to the exclusion of relevant evidence bearing on
the defendant's lack of mental culpability.

See Francis v.

Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 315-16 (1985).
The Utah Supreme Court repeatedly has ruled in recent
decisions that an instruction patterned after the presumption set
forth in Section 76-6-402(1) is unconstitutional and improper.
See State v. Smith, 726 P.2d 1232, 1235-36 (Utah 1986) ("Lest
there be a misunderstanding of our ruling in this case, we
emphatically declare that we do not retreat from Chambers. The
16

trial court should not have used the statutory language [of
Section 76-6-402(1)] in the instruction for the reasons stated in
Chambers"); 4 State v. Tarafa, 720 P.2d 1368, 1372 (Utah 1986)
("[B]ecause a reasonable juror could have understood the
challenged jury instruction to create a mandatory presumption
that shifted to the defendant the burden of persuasion on the
crucial element of intent and because the explanatory instruction
does not cure the error, the jury charge in this case does not
comport with the requirements of due process"); State v. Clayton,
658 P.2d 621, 624 (Utah 1983) (instruction "may have been in
error"); State v. Crowder, 197 P.2d 917, 921 (Utah 1948)
(instructing the jury with respect to the presumption was
erroneous); State v Turner, 736 P.2d 1043 (Utah 1987) (the
language of the presumption instruction is unconstitutional); but
see State v. Asay, 631 P.2d 861 (Utah 1981).

Consistent with the

principle that the trial court is the exclusive finder of fact
concerning evidentiary matters, and Utah law concerning the
impropriety of submitting an instruction to the jury patterned
after Section 76-6-402, the trial court's submission of the
Instruction to the jury in this matter was improper.
C. The Instruction Unconstitutionally Shifted the
Burden of Proof to Carlson.
It is beyond controversy that under the criminal law, the
4

In State v. Johnson, 745 P.2d 452, 456 (Utah 1987), the court
appears to have retreated from Chambers and without discussion simply
cites to Smith in support of the proposition that an instruction
patterned after the statutory presumption "was not defective." Id. That
decision is puzzling given the clear line of cases from the court on that
very issue.
17

burden is upon the prosection to prove all elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt.
[I]t is . . . to be kept in mind that the burden of
proving the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt
is always upon the state: both initially and
ultimately. Therefore, the only requirement on the
defense . . . is that it be sufficient to raise the
reasonable doubt.
State v. Robichaux, 639 P.2d 207 (Utah 1981) (quoting. State v.
Curtis, 542 P.2d 744 (Utah 1975); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358
(1970)).
The Court in Winship recognized the "reasonable doubt"
standard to be based on rights "'developed to safeguard men from
dubious and unjust convictions, with resulting forfeitures of
life, liberty and property.'"

Winship, 397 U.S. at 362-64

(quoting Davis v. U.S., 160 U.S. 469, 506 (1895)); see also State
v. Sorenson. 758 P.2d 466, 468-69 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (Due
Process requires prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
every fact necessary to constitute the crime charged); Utah Code
Ann. § 76-1-501 (1995); Utah Const, art. I, § 7; U.S. Const,
amend. V, XIV.5

As such, it "prohibits the State from using

evidentiary presumptions in a jury charge that have the effect of
relieving the State of its burden of persuasion beyond a

5

The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides,
in pertinent part, the following:
No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be
a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law . . . .
Its mandates are made applicable to states via the Fourteenth Amendment
of the United States Constitution.
Article I, sec. 7 of the Utah
Constitution likewise provides: "No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property, without due process of law." In this matter, the
Utah provision is given as much force as the federal counterpart. Carlson
is not seeking a distinct analysis under Utah's Art. I, sec. 7.
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reasonable doubt of every essential element of a crime."
Francis, 471 U.S. at 313.
Since presumptions and inferences "shift the burden of
production or persuasion to the defendant by requiring him or her
to present some evidence contesting the otherwise presumed or
inferred fact, these devices must satisfy certain due process
requirements."

Sorenson, 758 P.2d at 468.

"[I]n criminal cases, the ultimate test of any
[evidentiary] device's constitutional validity in a
given case remains constant: the device must not
undermine the factfinder's responsibility at trial,
based on evidence adduced by the State, to find the
ultimate facts beyond a reasonable doubt." State v.
Chambers, 709 P.2d 321, 325 (Utah 1985) (quoting County
Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 (1979). The use of any
mandatory rebuttable presumption which "requires the
jury to find the presumed element unless the defendant
persuades the jury that such a finding is unwarranted"
is one such evidentiary device found to be unconstitutional. Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 314 n. 2
(1985). See also Chambers, 709 P.2d at 326; State v.
Turner, 736 P.2d 1043, 1045 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
Sorenson, 758 P.2d at 468-69; Turner, 736 P.2d at 1045; Chambers,
709 P.2d at 326.
In determining whether a presumption instruction violates
the state and federal due process provisions, the threshold
question concerns the nature of the presumption, i.e. the
interpretation which a jury could have given the instruction.
Francis, 471 U.S. at 316; Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 514
(1979).
The presumption Instruction in this matter twice stated that
possession of property recently stolen, if not satisfactorily
explained, is a circumstance from which the jury may find that
19

Carlson had the requisite mental culpability to support a
conviction for the offense of receiving stolen property.
110, 267-69.)

(R.

The Instruction together with the entire jury

charge (see Addendum C) failed to inform the jury that the
presumption could be rebutted, or that Carlson was required only
to present "some" evidence to rebut the presumption.

In

addition, the prosecutor stated: The "only real issue here is
whether or not you buy his explanation as to how he gained
possession of this property.
about."

(R. 271-72.)

That's really what this case is all

That statement placed the burden squarely

on Carlson to prove his innocence.
The ambiguity of the Instruction alone and in the context of
the entire jury charge supports the determination that the jury
could have given the Instruction a mandatory or a permissive
interpretation, both of which violate the federal and state due
process provisions.
1. The "conclusive," mandatory interpretation is
unconstitutional.
Because the Instruction together with the jury charge failed
to further explain the effect of the presumption, the Instruction
effectively relieved the state of its burden of proof on a
critical element of the offense -- mental culpability.6

6

The

In this matter, Carlson did not dispute that he was driving the
Mazda truck on a suspended license at the time of the arrest. The only
issues for the jury to consider were whether he knew the truck was stolen
and whether he had the purpose of depriving the owner of the truck.
Carlson controverted those elements by introducing evidence solely on
those points. "Thus, the question before this Court is whether the
challenged jury instruction had the effect of relieving the State of the
(continued...)
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jury could well have interpreted the presumption as "conclusive,"
that is, not technically as a presumption at all, but
rather as an irrebuttable direction by the court to
find intent once convinced of the facts triggering the
presumption.
State v. Robichaux, 639 P.2d 207, 209-10 (Utah 1981).

Under the

conclusive approach, the state would be required only to
establish "possession."

Thereafter, the presumption Instruction

permitted the jury to find that Carlson (1) knew or had reason to
believe the truck was stolen and/or (2) possessed the property
with the purpose of depriving the owner of it.

That finding

could be made even if all other evidence together would not
establish the requisite mental state.

Thus, the Instruction

would effectively eliminate mental culpability as an ingredient
of the offense.
The United States Supreme Court in United States v. United
States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978), held that mental
culpability is an element that cannot be taken from the trier of
fact with the use of presumptions:
[A] defendant's state of mind or intent is an element
of a criminal antitrust offense which . . . cannot be
taken from the trier of fact through reliance on a
legal presumption of wrongful intent from proof of an
effect on prices. Cf. Morissette v. United States . . .
•

*

*

Although an effect on prices may well support an
inference that the defendant had knowledge of the
probability of such a consequence at the time he acted,
the jury must remain free to consider additional
evidence before accepting or rejecting the inference.
. . [U]ltimately the decision on the issue of intent
6

(...continued)
burden of proof enunciated in Winship on the critical question of
petitioner's state of mind." Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 520-21.
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must be left to the trier of fact alone. The
instruction given invaded this factfinding function.
Id. at 435.
As in United States Gypsum Co., the conclusive presumption
in this case would "conflict with the overriding presumption of
innocence with which the law endows the accused and which extends
to every element of the crime," and would "invade [the]
factfinding function" which in a criminal case the law assigns
solely to the jury.

Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 510 (quoting

Morissette v. U.S., 342 U.S. 246, 275 (1952); and United States
Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. at 446). The Instruction and jury charge
presented to Carlson's jury may have had exactly these
consequences.

Upon finding proof of one element of the crime

(possession), and of facts insufficient to establish his mental
state to knowingly and purposely commit the offense, Carlson's
jurors could reasonably have concluded that they were directed to
find against him on the element of mental culpability.

The state

was thus not forced to prove "beyond a reasonable doubt . . .
every fact necessary to constitute the crime . . . charged" and
Carlson was deprived of his constitutional rights as explicated
in Winship. See Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 523; Francis, 471 U.S. at
3 07 (although instruction informed jury twice that instruction
could be rebutted, the possibility that jury would interpret it
to create a mandatory presumption rendered it unconstitutional).
2. Under the "permissive" approach, the Instruction
shifts the burden of persuasion.
Alternatively, the jury could have interpreted the
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Instruction as permissive and concluded that upon proof by the
state of Carlson's possession of the vehicle, and of additional
facts not themselves establishing the element of knowing and
purposeful conduct, the burden was shifted
that he lacked the requisite mental state.

to Carlson to prove
The language of the

Instruction and the prosecutor's comments concerning the "only
real issue here" (R. 271-72) lend strong support to such an
interpretation.

The jury charge failed to remedy such an

interpretation.

(See

Addendum C.)

The jury may have charged Carlson with the burden of proving
a lack of mental culpability "by some quantum of proof which may
well have been considerably greater than 'some' evidence -- thus
effectively shifting the burden of persuasion on the element of
intent."

Robichaux, 639 P.2d at 209 (quoting Sandstrom, 442 U.S.

at 517); Chambers, 709 P.2d at 325.

The effect of such an

interpretation was illustrated by the Court in Mullaney v.
Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975).

In that case, the defendant was

charged in Maine with murder, which required proof not only of
intent but of malice.

The trial court instructed the jury that

"malice aforethought is an essential and indispensable element of
the crime of murder."

Id. at 686.

It also instructed that if

the prosecution established that the homicide was both
intentional and unlawful, malice aforethought was to be implied
unless the defendant proved by a fair preponderance of the
evidence that he acted in the heat of passion on sudden
provocation. Id.

The Court ruled that the defendant's due
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process rights were invaded by the presumption since it cast upon
him the burden of proving that he lacked the requisite mental
culpability to be convicted of murder.
In this matter, the state was required to prove possession,
knowing conduct and purpose.

(R. 112.)

The trial court

instructed the jury that it could convict Carlson of the charged
offense if the prosecution established possession, since mental
culpability could be presumed unless the jury bought Carlson's
"explanation as to how he gained possession of [the] property."
(R. 271-72.)

Because Carlson's jury may have interpreted the

trial court's instructions as constituting a burden-shifting
presumption, thereby depriving him of his right to the due
process of law, the Instruction alone and in the context of the
jury charge was unconstitutional.
3. Even if the Instruction is not unconstitutional
under the conclusive or permissive approach, it is
illogical and unreasonable.
The inference violates the state and federal due process
provisions if the suggested conclusion "is not one that reason
and common sense justify in light of the proven facts before the
jury."

Francis, 4 71 U.S. at 314.

The Supreme Court's rulings in

United States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136 (1965), and United States
v. Gainev, 380 U.S. 63 (1965), are illustrative of that point.
In Gainev, the Supreme Court upheld an instruction, which tracked
the language of a provision of the United States Code and
authorized the jury to infer from the defendant's unexplained
presence at an illegal still that he was carrying on "the
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business of a distiller or rectifier without having given bond as
required by law."

The Court reasoned that persons present at a

still, which was usually secreted in an isolated area, were most
likely connected with the business of carrying on the illegal
enterprise.

Gainey, 380 U.S. at 69-70.

After Gainev, the Court in Romano determined that "presence
at an illegal still" could not support an inference going to a
narrower offense that the defendant was in possession, custody,
or control of the still.

"Presence is relevant and admissible

evidence in a trial on a possession charge; but absent some
showing of the defendant's function at the still, its connection
with possession is too tenuous to permit a reasonable inference
of guilty -- 'the inference of the one from proof of the other is
arbitrary. . . '"

Romano, 382 U.S. at 141 (quoting Tot v. United

States, 319 U.S. 463, 467 (1943)); see also Barnes v. United
States, 412 U.S. 837, 841-42 (1973).
In Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969), the Court
stated that an inference is "'irrational' or 'arbitrary,' and
hence unconstitutional, unless it can at least be said with
substantial assurance that the presumed fact is more likely than
not to flow from the proved fact on which it is made to depend."
Id. at 36.

Presumptions and inferences do no more than "accord

to the evidence, if unexplained, its natural probative force."
Id. at 3 5 (cites omitted).
possession

of marihuana

The Court in Leary held that mere

did not support an inference that

defendant had the knowledge concerning a characteristic
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particular to that marihuana -- that it was illegally imported
into the United States. The possibility that any given marihuana
was domestically grown made the inference too tenuous.
Consistent with Gainev, Romano and Leary, the mere
possession of recently stolen property is not rationally
connected to an inference that a suspect had knowledge concerning
a characteristic particular to that property -- that it was
stolen.

The offense of knowingly possessing stolen property is

narrower than and is at least one step removed from the offense
of stealing the property.

Unless the suspect is charged with

accomplishing the theft, the possession presumption is irrational
and arbitrary.

See People v. Harris, 68 N.E.2d 728 (111. 1946)

(recent-unexplained possession principle is applicable to
larceny, not to receiving stolen property); Payne v. State, 43 5
P.2d 424 (Okla. 1968).
D.

Carlson Was Prejudiced by the Instruction.

The Utah Supreme Court has admonished trial courts that the
language of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-402(1) "should not be used in
any

form

to instruct juries in theft and burglary cases." Turner,

736 P.2d at 1045 (emphasis added).

Its effects are too

prejudicial.
In this case, Carlson did not confess to knowing or having
reason to know the truck he was driving on July 22, 1995, was
stolen, or that he was in possession of the truck for the purpose
of depriving the owner of it.

Rather, he confessed to other

misdemeanor offenses -- providing officers with false information
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concerning his identification and driving on a suspended license
-- and he acknowledged that he was in possession of the Mazda
truck on July 22, 1995.

(R. 199, 218-19, 224-26, 239.)

Carlson's defense was that he did not have the requisite
mental state to be convicted of the offense of receiving stolen
property.

The facts did not preclude that defense.

During the

trial, he presented witnesses to support his defense that he did
not have a belief that the Mazda truck was stolen.

His mother

and friends testified to the events preceding his arrest -- his
car was taken by "Laura," he worked on the Mazda truck to get it
running, and he began searching for Laura in order to get his car
back.

(See R. 249, 253, 255-57.)

Because Carlson's culpable mental state was plainly at issue
in this case, and was not overwhelmingly proved by the evidence,
the presentation to the jury of the presumption Instruction
together with the additional instructions was not harmless.

The

possibility exists that the jury could have believed that proof
of Carlson's presence in the truck was sufficient to convict him
of knowing the Mazda was stolen.

The possibility also exists

that the jury believed Carlson should have been charged with
stealing the property.

The improper Instruction and jury charge

serve to accommodate such prejudicial beliefs.
Because the Instruction was presented to the jury in
violation of Utah statutory and case law and in violation of the
due process provisions of the state and federal constitutions,
and because the jury instructions in their entirety failed to
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cure the infirmity, the instructions in the aggregate prejudiced
Carlson.

The judgment must be vacated.

POINT II. THE PROSECUTOR'S REMARKS DURING CLOSING
ARGUMENT CALLED THE ATTENTION OF THE JURORS TO MATTERS
THEY WERE NOT JUSTIFIED IN CONSIDERING.
In addition to presenting the jury with an unconstitutional,
improper Instruction (see Point I, supra), the trial court
permitted the prosecutor to make remarks during closing argument
that called the attention of the jurors to circumstances they
were not justified in considering in connection with a verdict.
The prosecutor specifically asked the jurors to consider the
following: "If after this case is all over you walk out to the
parking lot and you discovered that somebody has stolen your
vehicle, and two or three days go by and all of a sudden as
you're driving down the road, you see your vehicle and you see
Mr. Carlson driving that vehicle. . . and you pull him over . . .
I submit to you there isn't one of you that would let him go."
(R. 293-94.)

The prosecutor implored the jurors on that basis to

resist "letting [Carlson] go" on the charged offense.

(Id.)

Those remarks were not based on the evidence, but were used
to evoke emotion.

"Statements which suggest that the jury has an

obligation to convict a defendant on some basis other than solely
on the evidence before it are improper and beyond the broad
latitude allowed in closing argument."

State v. Andreason, 718

P.2d 400, 402 (Utah 1986).
It is improper for a prosecutor to "divert the jury from its
duty to decide the case on the evidence."
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ABA Standards for

Criminal Justice Prosecution Function and Defense Function § 35.8(d) (3d ed. 1993) .
The [prosecutor] is the representative not of an
ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty
whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling
as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest,
therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it
shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As
such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the
servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that
guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may
prosecute with earnestness and vigor -- indeed, he
should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he
is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much
his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to
produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every
legitimate means to bring about a just one.
Bercrer v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935); see also. United
States v. Teslim, 896 F.2d 316 (7th Cir. 1989) (noting
impropriety of "golden rule" argument, whereby prosecutor
encourages jurors to put themselves in the position of the
victim).
The remarks were not only improper, but they also were
prejudicial.

Where the proof of a defendant's guilt is strong,

Utah courts "will not presume the improper remark to be
prejudicial.

But in a case with less than compelling proof, we

will more closely scrutinize the prosecutor's conduct."
Andreason, 718 P.2d at 402-03.

Where evidence of mental

culpability on the part of the defendant is based entirely on
circumstantial evidence and "presumptions", as in this matter,
jurors are more likely influenced by an improper
argument. In such instances, they are more susceptible
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to the suggestion that factors other than the evidence
before them should determine a defendant's guilt or
innocence. . . . In view of the highly marginal nature
of any evidence of criminal intent or knowledge on the
part of defendant, a reasonable likelihood exists that
in the absence of the prosecutor's prejudicial
argument, there might have been a different result.
Id.
Criminal intent or knowledge in this case was presented in
the form of an improper Instruction concerning factual
inferences.

(See Point I, supra.)

There was no direct evidence

that Carlson was aware that the Mazda truck was stolen
particularly since it had a damaged front end (R. 207-08), was in
need of repairs (R. 209), and, according to the state's
witnesses, bore no sign of forced entry or that anyone had broken
into it.

(R. 171, 187.)

Although Carlson stated to Sheets that

the "vehicle isn't stolen" (R. 179-80), such a statement tracks
the fact that Carlson was driving a truck that did not belong to
him and that he believed belonged to Laura.

While the state's

witnesses were in conflict as to whether a "bypass" ignition had
been placed on the steering column of the truck (R. 167-68, 172,
185-86), the state's witness who testified that he saw the
ignition also stated that the device may be used if the original
ignition is not working properly, which comports with the fact
that the truck was in disrepair.

(R. 172.)

If the conclusion of the jurors is based on their
weighing conflicting evidence or evidence susceptible
of differing interpretations, there is a greater
likelihood that they will be improperly influenced
through remarks of counsel. Indeed, in such cases, the
jurors may be searching for guidance in weighing and
interpreting the evidence. They may be especially
susceptible to influence, and a small degree of
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influence may be sufficient to affect the verdict.
Counsel is obligated in such cases to avoid, as far as
possible, any reference to those matters the jury is
not justified in considering.
State v. Trov, 688 P.2d 483, 486-87 (Utah 1984).
Since (1) the argument directed the jurors' attention to
matters outside the evidence of the case, i.e., that if they were
the victims of such a crime, they would not want the finder of
fact to "let [Carlson] go," and (2) the error was substantial and
prejudicial such that in its absence there was a reasonable
likelihood of a more favorable result for Carlson, the
impropriety of the remarks merits vacation of the judgment.
State v. Hopkins, 782 P.2d 475, 478 (Utah 1989).
REASONS WHY ORAL ARGUMENT SHOULD BE GRANTED AND OPINION
ISSUED.
Oral argument and a published opinion vacating the judgment
and remanding this case to the trial court for a new trial would
clarify the use by the trial court of jury instructions that
create presumptions going to the crucial element of intent,
specifically where the instruction is not established by the Utah
code or other penal statute. In addition, a published opinion
would remind trial courts that such instructions are prejudicial
and compromise a defendant's due process rights.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Carlson respectfully requests that
this Court vacate the conviction and judgment entered in the
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trial court, and remand the case to the trial court for a new
trial.
SUBMITTED this 2FU

day of July, 1996.

~K{ Qfuf^
M. JONES
Attorney for DeffsJndant/Appellant
JINDA

REBECCA HYDE
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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Appeals, 230 South 500 East, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah
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Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854, this ASi£
July, 1996.
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ADDENDUM A

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE
(COMMITMENT)

Plaintiff,
vs.

T)u;flyhft Marvin

Cbrlson /

Case No.
Count No.
Honorable

Clerk

Q<r/9n/s"7/
W±dkmt*

ffipck

R e p o r t e r ^ 1r ft cL

Bailiff - f f i / /

Date Jkjf/tb

Oefendant.

^QU^ifA

SLakbe^l

D The motion of
to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and
impose sentence accordingly is D granted D denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted b y £ ( a jury; D the court; D plea of guilty;
D plea of no contest; of the offense of P e c &i V*L tfrr ~firah*>, £ - f nI P ^ Pr-o ppjriy
, a felony
of then7r>^l. degree, D a class
misdemeanor, being now present in court and ready for sentence and
represented by ft, Hydfi*
, and the State being represented by K. Bet/mtJs-^^fl&hw
adjudged guilty
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison:
D
D
^ o
D
D
D
D

to a maximum mandatory term of
years and which may be for life;
not to exceed five years;
f not less than one year nor more than fifteen years;
£ S^h/t^/ %A. )
of not less than five years and which may be for life;
not to exceed
years;
and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of
and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $
to

D such sentence is to run concurrently with
D such sentence is to run consecutively with
D upon motion of D State, Q Defense, • Court, Count(s)
are hereby dismissed.
D
^ D e f e n d a n t is granted a stay of the above (O prison) sentence and placed on probation in the
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult
Parole for the period of 3 v?
tyon+hjz
, pursuant to the attached conditions of probation.
^C Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County • for delivery to the Utah State
Prison, Draper, Utah, orljkfor delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be confined
and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment.
Commitment shall issue
DATED this
APPROVED AS TO FORM:
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
Defense Counsel

Deputy County Attorney

S
Page

. /

of o£

#

Judgment/State v.

VUSayn^

MQrVtik

LdtdSeiLJCR

c

t5tft>iS''7l

/Honorable faJ-

B»

Sir!

4*

CONDITIONS OF PROBATION
&UJsual and ordinary conditions required by the Dept. of Adult Probation & Parole.
I
D Serve
L&
mOI\+h*>
6fr> b*~*reJe**rA
Only 4o Pep-h, h+ Lorir, proj,
ih
O^A^h\
in the Salt Lake County Jail commencing ^ P i r M ) ^ / ^
_
^
D Pay a fine in the amount of $
D at a rate to be determined by the Department of Adult Probation and
Parole; or • at the rate of
.
D Pay restitution in the amount of $
; or • in an amount to be determined by the Department of Adult
Probation and Parole; D at a rate of
; or D at a rate to be determined by
the Department of Adult Probation and Parole.
D Enter, participate in, and complete any
program, counseling, or treatment as
directed by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole,
D Enter, participate in, and complete th
D Participate in and complete any D educational; and/or D vocational training • as directed by the
Department of Adult Probation and Parole; or D with
• Participate in and complete any
training D as directed by the Department of Adult
Probation and Parole; or D with
D Submit person, residence, and vehicle to search and seizure for the detection of drugs.
D Submit to drug testing.
D Not associate with anyone who illegally uses, sells, or otherwise distrubutes narcotics or drugs.
D Not frequent any place where drugs are used, sold, or otherwise distributed illegally.
D Not use or possess non-prescribed controlled substances.
D Refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages.
D Submit to testing for alcohol use.
D Take antabuse • as directed by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole.
D Obtain and maintain full-time employment.
D Maintain full-time employment.
D Obtain and maintain full-time employment or full-time schooling.
D Maintain full-time employment or obtain and maintain full-time schooling.
D Defendant is to have no contact nor associate with
D Defendant's probation may be transferred to
under the Interstate Compact as approved
by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole.
D Complete
hours of community service restitution as directed by the Department of Adult Probation
and Parole.
• Complete
hours of community service restitution in lieu of
days in jail.
• Defendant is to commit no crimes.
D Defendant is ordered to appear before this Court on
for a review of this sentence.
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Skills

ausrin*

H-im*

in.

yi X)ffi' "H 7 Sib* a4rpptoen+ -for TM\1 ^i«\QHhi~ p f Chid supp* Qtrtn^s*
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D
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ADDENDUM B

41-la-1316. Receiving or transferring stolen motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer — Penalty.
It is a second degree felony for a person:
(1) with intent to procure or pass title to a motor vehicle, trailer, or
semitrailer that he knows or has reason to believe has been stolen or
unlawfully taken to receive or transfer possession of the motor vehicle,
trailer, or semitrailer from or to another; or
(2) to have in his possession any motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer
that he knows or has reason to believe has been stolen or unlawfully
taken if he is not a peace officer engaged at the time in the performance of
his duty.

76-1-503. Presumption of fact.
An evidentiary presumption established by this code or other penal statute
has the following consequences:
(1) When evidence of facts which support the presumption exist, the
issue of the existence of the presumed fact must be submitted to the jury
unless the court is satisfied that the evidence as a whole clearly negates
the presumed fact;
(2) In submitting the issue of the existence of a presumed fact to the
jury, the court shall charge that while the presumed fact must on all
evidence be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the law regards the facts
giving rise to the presumption as evidence of the presumed fact.

76-6-402. Presumptions and defenses.
The following presumption shall be applicable to this part:
(1) Possession of property recently stolen, when no satisfactory explanation of such possession is made, shall be deemed prima facie evidence
that the person in possession stole the property.
(2) It is no defense under this part that the actor has an interest in the
property or service stolen if another person also has an interest that the
actor is not entitled to infringe, provided an interest in property for
purposes of this subsection shall not include a security interest for the
repayment of a debt or obligation.
(3) It is a defense under this part that the actor:
(a) Acted under an honest claim of right to the property or service
involved; or
(b) Acted in the honest belief that he had the right to obtain or
exercise control over the property or service as he did; or
(c) Obtained or exercised control over the property or service
honestly believing that the owner, if present, would have consented.

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

ARTICLE I
DECLARATION OF
RIGHTS
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process
of law.

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

AMENDMENT V
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — Due process
of law and just compensation clauses.]
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in
time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation.

AMENDMENT XIV
Section
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment.]
3. [Disqualification to hold office.]

Section
4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of
the Confederacy and claims not
to be paid.]
5. [Power to enforce amendment.]

Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Sec. 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment.]
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election
for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States,
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or
the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.

Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.]
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such
disability.

Sec. 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the
Confederacy and claims not to be paid.]
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law,
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in
suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the
United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any
claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations,
and claims shall be held illegal and void.

Sec. 5. [Power to enforce amendment.]
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article.

ADDENDUM C

INSTRUCTION NO.
As

jurors,

it

is your

exclusive

responsibility

to

determine the issues of fact in this case and you are to decide
those issues from the evidence received in the trial and not from
speculation or conjecture.
The evidence
testimony

of

to be considered by you

witnesses,

exhibits

received

by

includes the
the

court,

stipulations of the parties, reasonable inferences to be drawn from
facts proven in the case, presumptions, if any, as are stated in
these

instructions,

disclosed thereby.

and

all of

the

facts

and

circumstances

Statements of counsel are not evidence and

should not be considered as such by you.
If and where there is a conflict in the evidence, you
should reconcile such conflict as far as you reasonably can; but
where the conflict cannot be reconciled then, since you are the
final judges of the facts and the credibility of the witnesses, you
must resolve that conflict and determine from the evidence what you
believe the true facts to be.
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INSTRUCTION NO.
The State of Utah and the defendants both are entitled to
the individual opinion of each juror.

It is the duty of each of

you after considering all the evidence in the case, to determine,
if possible, the question of guilt or innocence of the defendant.
When you have reached a conclusion in that respect, you should not
change it merely because one or more or all of your fellow jurors
may have come to a different conclusion.

However, each juror

should freely and fairly discuss with his fellow jurors the
evidence and the deduction to be drawn therefrom.

If after doing

so, any juror should be satisfied that a conclusion first reached
by him was wrong, he unhesitatingly should abandon that original
opinion and render his verdict according to his final decision.

n r\ a <\ * -

INSTRUCTION NO,
If, after a careful, honest, and impartial consideration
of these instruction and all of the evidence admitted in the case,
any of your number should honestly and conscientiously differ ont
he weight and affect to be given to the evidence and the verdict to
be rendered, than I instinct you that you may disagree, and you are
not called upon to surrender your honest convictions concerning the
effect of the evidence in this case, or as to the verdict to be
rendered, for the mere purpose of agreeing upon a verdict.
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INSTRUCTION NO.
To constitute the crime charged in the information there
must be the joint operation of two essential elements:

conduct

prohibited by law and the appropriate culpable mental state or
states with regard to the conduct prohibited by law.
Before a defendant may be found guilty of a crime, the
evidence must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
was

prohibited

from

committing

the

conduct

charged

in

the

information and that the defendant committed such conduct with
the culpable mental state required for such offense.
"Conduct" means an act or omission.
"Act" means a voluntary bodily movement and includes speech.
"Omission" means a failure to act when there is a legal duty
to act and the actor is capable of acting.

a (t\ ! ^ ^

INSTRUCTION NO.
You are instructed that in every crime or public offense,
there must be a union or joint operation of the act and intent.
A person is only guilty of an offense when his conduct is
prohibited by law and he acts with some kind of criminal intent
that is, he acts intentionally or knowingly as the definition of an
offense requires.
As used in these instruction, a person engages in conduct
"intentionally" or with intent, when it is his conscious objective
or desire to engage in conduct or cause the result.
As used

in these instructions, a person engages in

conduct "knowingly" or with knowledge, when he is aware that his
conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.
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INSTRUCTION NO.
The intent with which an act is done denotes a state of
mind and connotes a purpose in so acting.

Intent being a state of

mind is seldom susceptible of proof by direct and positive evidence
and must ordinarily be inferred from acts, conduct, statements and
circumstances.

Thus, you would be justified in inferring that a

person must have intended the natural and probable consequences of
any act purposely done by him.

0OOJ&

INSTRUCTION NO.
Two classes of evidence are recognized and admitted in
courts of justice, upon either or both of which, juries lawfully
may base their findings, whether favorable to the State or to the
defendant, provided, however, that to support a verdict of guilt
the evidence, whether of one kind or the other or a combination of
both, must carry the convincing quality required by law.
One type of evidence is known as direct and the other as
circumstantial.

The law makes no distinction between the two

classes as to the degree of proof required for conviction or as to
their effectiveness in defendant's favor, but respects each for
such convincing force as it may carry and accepts each as a
reasonable method of proof.
Direct evidence of a person's conduct at any time in
question consists of the testimony of every witness who, with any
of his own physical senses, perceived such conduct or any part
thereof, and which testimony describes or relates what thus was
perceived.

All

other

evidence

admitted

in

the

trial

is

circumstantial in relation to such conduct, and, insofar as it
shows any act, statement or other conduct, or any circumstance of
fact, tending to prove by reasonable inference the innocence or
guilt of the defendant, it may be considered by you in arriving at
a verdict.
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INSTRUCTION NO.

A person charged with a crime is presumed to be innocent until
he is proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The presumption of
innocence is not a mere form to be disregarded by the jury at
pleasure but is a substantial, essential part of the law and is
binding upon the jury. This presumption is a humane provision of
the law, intended, so far as human agency is capable, to guard
against the danger of an innocent person being unjustly punished.
The presumption of innocence must continue to prevail in the
minds of the jury unless and until the jury is satisfied beyond a
reasonable doubt of the guilt of the defendant, and, in case of a
reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt, he is entitled to an
acquittal.
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INSTRUCTION NOYou are instructed that the mere fact that the defendant
has been charged with this offense and has been held to answer to
the charge by a committing magistrate, is not any evidence of his
guilt and is not even a circumstance which should be considered by
you in determining his guilt or innocence.

•flfta 1 , 1 , .

INSTRUCTION NO.
You are instructed that the information the defendant has
entered a plea of not guilty.

The plea of not guilty denies each

and all of the essential allegations of the charge contained in the
information and casts upon the State the burden of proving each and
all of the essential allegations thereof to your satisfaction and
beyond a reasonable doubt.

(IfllH^

INSTRUCTION NO
You are instructed that the defendant is a competent
witness in his own behalf and his testimony should be received and
given the same consideration as you give to that of any other
witness. The fact that he stands accused of a crime is no evidence
of his guilt

and

is no reason for rejecting his testimony.

However, you should weigh his testimony the same as you weigh the
testimony of any other witness.
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INSTRUCTION NO.

v \

V

The fact that the defendant has been convicted o£ a ui'line
may be considered by you for only one purpose, namely, in judging
the credibility of such testimony.

The fact of such rsr^Onvicgtqn

does not necessarily destroy or impair the defendant's credibility,
and it does not raise a presumption that the defendant or witness
has testified falsely.

It is simply one of the circumstances that

you are to take into consideration in weighing the testimony of
such a witness.
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INSTRUCTION NO.
Possession

of

property

recently

stolen,

if

not

satisfactorily explained, is ordinarily a circumstance from which
you may reasonably draw the inference and find, in light of the
surrounding circumstances shown by the evidence in the case, that
the person

in possession

of

the

stolen property

stole

the

property and knew that the property was stolen.
Thus, if you find from the evidence and beyond a reasonable
doubt (1) that the defendant was in possession of property, (2)
that the property was stolen, (3) that such possession was not
too remote in point of time from the theft, and

(4) that no

satisfactory explanation of such possession has been given or
appears from the evidence, then you may infer from those facts
and find that the defendant stole the property and knew the
property was stolen.
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INSTRUCTION NO.

It is a defense that the defendant acted in the honest
belief that he had the right to obtain or exercise control over
the property or service as he did.
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INSTRUCTION NO.
Before you can convict the defendant, Dwayne Carlson, of the
offense of Receiving a Stolen Motor Vehicle as charged in Count I
of the Information, you must find from all of the evidence and
beyond a reasonable doubt each and every one of the following
elements of that offense:
1.

That on or about the 22nd day of July, 1995, in Salt

Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant, Dwayne Carlson, had in
his possession a motor vehicle;
2•

and

That the defendant knew that said property had been

stolen or had reason to believe that said property had been
stolen;
3.

and
That the defendant had in his possession said property

with the purpose to deprive the owner thereof.
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in
this case, you are convinced of the truth of each and every one
of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you
must find the defendant guilty of Receiving a Stolen Motor
Vehicle as charged in Count I of the Information.

If, on the

other hand, you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of
any one or more of the foregoing elements, then you must find the
defendant not guilty of Count I.
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INSTRUCTION NO.
"Property"

means

anything

of

value,

including

tangible

personal property.
"Purpose to deprive" means to have the conscious object to
withhold property permanently or for so extended a period or to
use

under

circumstances

that

a

substantial

portion

of

its

economic value, or of the use and benefit thereof, would be lost,
or to restore the property only upon payment of a reward or other
compensation, or to dispose of the property under circumstances
that make it unlikely that the owner will recover it.
"Receives" means acquiring possession, control, or title or
lending on the security of the property.

INSTRUCTION NO.

If in these instructions any rule , direction or idea has been stated in varying ways, no
emphasis thereon is intended, and none must be inferred by you. For that reason, you are
not to single out any certain sentence, or any individual point or instruction, but you are to
consider the instructions as a whole, and to regard each in the light of all the others.
The order in which the instructions are given has no significance as to their relative
importance.
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INSTRUCTION NO.
In arriving at a verdict in this case, you shall not discuss
nor consider the subject of penalty or punishment, as that is a
matter which lies with the Court and other governmental agencies,
and must not in any way affect your decision as to the guilt or
innocence of a defendant.
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INSTRUCTION NO.

The attitude and conduct of jurors at the outset of their deliberations are a matter of
considerable importance. It is rarely productive of good for a juror, upon entering the jury
room, to make an emphatic expression of their opinion on the case or to announce a
determination to stand for a certain verdict. When one does that at the outset, their sense of
pride may be aroused, and they may hesitate to recede from an announced position even if
shown that it is fallacious. Remember that you are not partisans or advocates in this matter,
but are judges. The final test of the quality of your service will lie in the verdict which you
return to the court not in the opinions any of you may hold as you retire to begin your
deliberations. Have in mind that you will make a definite contribution to efficient judicial
administration if you arrive at a just and proper verdict. To that end, the court would
remind you that in your deliberations in the jury room there can be no triumph excepting the
ascertainment and declaration of the truth and the administration of justice based thereon.
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INSTRUCTION NO.
The

court

has

endeavored

to give

you

instructions

embodying all rules of law that may become necessary in guiding you
to a just and lawful verdict.

The applicability of some of these

instructions will depend upon the conclusions you reach as to what
the facts are.

As to any such instruction, the fact that it has

been given must not be taken as indicating an opinion of the court
and that the instruction will be necessary or as to what the facts
are.

If an instruction applies only to a state of facts which you

find does not exist, you will disregard the instruction.
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INSTRUCTION NO.
When you retire to consider your verdict, you will select one
of your members to act as foreperson, who, as foreperson, will
preside over your deliberation.
Your verdict in this case must be either;
Guilty of Receiving a Stolen Vehicle,
OR
Not guilty;
as your deliberations may determine.
This being a criminal case, a unanimous concurrence of all
jurors is required to find a verdict.
writing, and when

Your verdict must be in

found, must be signed and dated by your

foreperson and then returned by you to this court.

When your

verdict has been found, notify the bailiff that you are ready to
report to the Court.
DATE at Salt Lake City, Utah this / /

day of

(^y^r^U^^

1995.

PAT B . BRIAN,

GOOil^

